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IS the 
PARTY OVER?
The major parties, we are told, are 'on the nose'. The old 
left parties are in decline. Is the political party as we've 
known it  in the Twentieth Century an anachronism? 
Sarah Benton, writing from Britain, thinks it is.
The political party as we have known it is an anachronism. Out of all the tasks it is set 
there are only two it can carry out 
with any adequacy: it can contest 
elections and it can produce a caste 
of professional politicians to take 
part in the ritual of public affairs. 
People have expected so much 
more.
But the party can rarely enforce 
democracy in government or civil life; 
where "the private" advances, so the 
party’s’s control of the state recedes. 
It does not usually emancipate its in­
dividual members; it is not a means 
through which people can exercise 
more choice in their lives or more con­
trol over their lives. It is not an 
"authentic" voice of the people; the 
m ost common view of party 
politicians is that they lie. Far from 
standing for democracy, for most 
people, the political party represents 
ritual tedium for the masses who at 
worst fear they are subjected to the 
professional exclusivity, fanaticism 
and manipulation of the few. It is not 
surprising that political parties of the 
old sort are in decline all over Europe 
and North America. Only those that 
have changed their ways face the fu­
ture with anticipation.
Th "old parties" are those that were 
established by the 1920s. They dif­
fered from each other in ideology and 
social composition but they were all a 
response to two phenomena; the ad­
vent of the mass vote and the emer­
gence of the all-powerful nation state. 
Each of these - the state and the mass 
vote - shaped the development of the 
other through the medium of the party. 
The pace-makers were the mass par­
ties with a formal ideology of 
socialism - including the fascists of 
Italy and the Nazis of Germany, both 
of which began with, at least, a 
rhetoric of power to the masses via the 
state as, of course, did the communist 
parties.
Unlike the upper class, with its ac­
cess to many forms of power through 
the army (Prussia in particular), 
church (Italy), land (most of Eastern 
Europe), and business (Britain, Ger­
many, USA) both the professional 
middle class and the then huge work­
ing class had access to power only 
through the state. Unlike the upper 
class, their only access to the state was 
through the party. The development of 
systems of mass production, especial­
ly in the USA, Germany and Britain, 
also shaped the mass vote and 
produced the potent imagery of the 
working class as a single, dynamic 
whole.
Even those who were dismayed by 
the dawn of the party age, noted the 
exciting power of mass politics. "All 
is hurry and agitation; night is used for 
travel, day for business, even ‘holiday 
trips’ have become a strain on the 
nervous system. Important political, 
industrial and financial crises carry 
excitement into far wider circles of 
people than they used to do; political
life is engaged in quite generally; 
political, religious and social strug­
gles, party-politics, electioneering, 
and the enormous spread of trade 
unionism inflame tempers, place an 
ever greater strain on the mind, and 
encroach upon the hours for recrea­
tion, sleep and rest" (This is Freud in 
1893, quoting a contemporary in 
'Civilised' Sexual Morality.)
The catastrophic failure of 
capitalism after the first world war en­
sured that the mass parties represented 
the best claim to manage the future. 
With the dereliction of mass un­
employment, only a greatly enlarged 
role for the state could produce 
balance, stability and social equity .To 
socialists of all sorts this was so ob­
vious it was just common sense. 
Where social democrats diverged 
from communists and fascists was in 
their pursuit of a state that would be 
invulnerable to demagogues and the 
mob.
It was their parties that took the lead 
in shaping modem politics. In the 
name of delivering power to the 
people, socialist parties from the 
1930s and particularly after the 
second world war treated politics as a 
profession and reforming society as a 
matter of good management. The 
crunch came in the 1950s; those 
governments which had ceded fewest 
political rights in civil society, for 
workers or consumers for instance, 
found themselves the most stultified. 
They produced a form of government
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which cannot regenerate its own 
political drive, whether it was the 
Soviet Union’s "era of stagnation" 
or Britain’s Labour Party.
Today’s Right is quite right to 
recognise that an era was ending in 
the 1960s. Before 1950, it was still 
possible to conceive of the political 
party as the "modern prince", 
modem because the collective 
agency of party had superseded the 
mediaeval individual leader, but a 
prince nonetheless, an heroic en­
tity. This romantic conception of 
party endured until the 1960s; it 
nestled even in the most prosaic 
bosom of British Labour. For in­
stance, Francis Williams, a true 
Labour loyalist, friend of Clem At­
tlee and former editor of the Daily 
Herald, describes the birth of the 
Labour Party (Fifty Years March, 
The Rise Of The Labour Party) in 
this way; "And now, on that 
February morning in 1900, the cur­
tain was rising on a new act in this 
tremendous drama..." And: "The 
Party bom on that grey February 
day in a drab commercial street off 
Fleet Street was to ... mobilise be­
hind it and become the chief instru­
ment of a political uprising of the 
working classes of Britain that was 
to change the social and economic 
face of the country out of all recog­
nition ..." This hero would go on to 
carry through "a programme which 
would have seemed the wildest and 
most revolutionary utopianism to 
those passing along Farringdon 
Street about their ordinary business 
on that February day in the first 
year of the new century".
Romantic? Undoubtedly. Fran­
cis Williams was writing in 1950.
A dip into any account of politics be­
tween 1890 and 1920 will come up 
with even more stirring stuff. Thus 
(and quite randomly), a Mr. Pickles 
urging political unity at the Co-opera- 
tive Movement in 1917: "I am attend­
ing meetings one night as a socialist, 
another as a trade unionist, and 
another as a member of a co-operative 
board, but I am working for
democracy in sections... Let us put all 
our cards on the table, stand together, 
and go forward for democracy - (ap­
plause) - triumphant democracy". His 
rallying cry was for party unity, but he 
spoke too for the unity of the masses 
who made the party. The hero of 
modernist imagery in the 1920s and 
1930s was, if not the mass itself, an 
anonymous worker, individual in 
statuesque form but not in character.
Like a prince of old, the party 
demanded loyalty, inspired love 
and devotion, promised delivery 
from evil, fought battles on behalf 
of the needy, brought nobility into 
the grey, drab lives of the many. 
Because it was a collective, it also 
exacted discipline and demanded 
sacrifice. It would not have bedn 
heroic had it not (The forms and 
imagery of the military were never 
very fair away either.) And if the 
party was a heroic warrior, so, too, 
were the people. The party was the 
people, they and it were a single 
whole.
Nobody today regards the party 
in this way. Lingering romantics 
see it as having been "corrupted" 
by power or betrayed by weak, sus­
ceptible men while the working 
class retains its character as a mar­
tyred unity. For others, the loss of 
illusion is just part of the modem 
condition. The loss of faith is in the 
party, in the state, in politics itself
- and in the masses. To read today 
the futurists quoted by Marshall 
Berman (All That Is Solid "We 
will sing of great crowds excited by 
work, by pleasure and by riot; we 
will sing of the multicolored, 
polyphonic tides of revolution in 
the modem capitals", is to know we 
live in a different era.
Today we do not believe that the 
mass can be made into a single, 
heroic whole by a political party. 
As Marshall Berman notes, a dis­
tinctive feature of today’s moder­
nity is the sense of fragmentation, 
accompanied by a generalised loss 
of meaning. The "new times” ar­
gued by Stuart Hall (ALR 108) are 
characterised thus: "greater frag­
mentation and pluralism, the weaken­
ing of older collective solidarities and 
block identities and the emergence of 
new identities associated with greater 
work flexibility,the maximisation of 
individual choices through personal 
consumption" .Not only is the whole 
fragmented, so is the "self’ too. The 
Co-op’s Mr. Pickles in 1917 perhaps 
felt the same; unlike us with our
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kaleidoscopic selves, he felt all could 
be made whole by the party. He felt 
his individual, sensate self should be 
lost in the party surge to democracy.
Our conceptions of party have not 
been brought into line with this new 
reality of multiple selves who can no 
longer be marshalled into one mass 
party with a single aim: to win control 
of an all-embracing state. The at­
tempts by party leaders to reshape 
their parties as both professional elites 
and purveyors of popular political cul­
ture are jagged with these contradic­
tions. Here the crisis of purpose runs 
deep. What are all those members for? 
If party members are the cadres of a 
political mission, what exactly is that 
mission? For the old form of party is 
an anachronism not only because it’s 
the wrong shape, not only because we 
no longer come in just two or three 
classes, but because so much power 
has been shifted out of the state 
machinery which the party was 
shaped to control.
The desultory connections of 
people, party, parliament and state are 
common to many countries. They are 
testament to the disappearance of 
power; like the Scarlet Pimpernel, 
political power no longer has a fixed, 
visible locus. It is not found firmly in 
the state and certainly not in the par­
liament; it is not tucked in the pockets 
of MIS pursuing its paranoid fantasies 
through our keyholes nor is it filed in 
the cabinets of Luxembourg or Brus­
sels. It is not floating in a silicon val­
ley or sitting snugly in the IMF, the 
Group of 7, the headquarters of Coca 
Cola, among Italian freemasons cir­
cling the Vatican or in the safe of a 
mighty arms manufacturer.
It’s in all those places and none, 
here, there and nowhere. There is no 
single citadel to be captured, no com­
manding height which, once scaled, 
gives a political party power over the 
civic universe. As the fragments of 
power whirl frustratingly in and out of 
vision, conspiracy theories multiply. 
Many of them are correct; there are in­
deed conspiracies hatched and carried 
out by private companies, shady net­
works of military and commercial in­
terests, the state’s secret underworld. 
Some do considerable damage; all are 
anti-democratic. Never dismiss a 
good conspiracy when one is hauled 
into the daylight But do not either at­
tribute to it a Boy's Own capacity to 
rule the world through its secretly ac­
quired powers. The world’s not like 
that.
If political power cannot be 
delivered by simple control over the 
nation state, then the form and func­
tions of parties, designed to win such 
control, have to change if they are to 
survive.
It is for this reason, as much as the 
changing sociology of class relations, 
that the Conservatives in Britain have 
been the dominant power this decade. 
Their rhetoric of rolling back the fron­
tiers of the state is an acknowledgment 
of the limits of the nation state in 
today’s conjunction of economic and 
political power. This is not because 
the Thatcherites were immensely 
more percipient than the socialists; 
rather it was because the Conserva­
tives have never been so dependent on 
state powers to get what they want. 
They have thus had a freedom of 
manoeuvre in a changing world which 
parties of the Left have not enjoyed. 
The fact that much which constitutes 
"Thatcherism" has been, like earlier 
Conservative eras, an ad hoc response 
to circumstances is clear. In Popular 
Capitalism, John Redwood, a tipped- 
for-the-top British Tory MP who 
worked in Thatcher’s policy unit, 
describes how accidentally they ar­
rived at privatisation. The strategy 
that became the driving force of 
Thatcherism was not planned but 
stumbled upon.
Parties in other countries have fol­
lowed suit, though much less 
wholeheartedly. The crisis for British 
left parties has been far more acute 
both because the economic problems 
which the nation state is expected to 
solve have been more grave for much 
longer; and also because of the 
peculiar role of trade unions in 
Britain. In no other country have
unions, party and state been tied 
together so intractably in what be­
came a deadening mission to create a 
bureaucratic corporate state.
At the time it seemed to be a jugger­
naut that could not be diverted. Hence, 
what seems like the overkill of 
Thatcherism in severing those links. 
For Labour, the consequences have 
been near-fatal. Because that alliance 
was dominated by a peculiarly British 
labourist/corporate view of political 
power, the Labour establishment was 
also less flexible, less responsive to 
both external circumstances and to 
nudges for change that came from 
below. For it should not be forgotten 
that criticisms of Labour’s depend­
ence on a bureaucratic state and un­
democratic union leaderships came 
first from the left.
In the 1980s, the political party be­
came a magnet for the movement 
which had developed out of the ’60s 
and ’70s. This is a comment on the 
limits of movements, a pointer to what 
parties alone can deliver.
Unlike the party, harnessed to the 
needs of the state, the movement was 
truly "modem". It rejected class as a 
determinant of individual political 
choice. It sought to eliminate the gap 
between personal feeling and public 
action. The liberation of the political 
actors was as important as, if not more 
important than, the conquest of op­
ponents. The movement rejected in­
stitutions for itself, as these would 
tend to freeze political positions and 
embed conflicts to win control. It 
upheld direct action both as a form of 
self-expression and as more effective 
than formal political procedures. The 
movement was oriented towards ac­
tion, but changing culture and at­
titudes were goals as legitimate as law 
reform. Its modernism lay in its rejec­
tion of the idea that there is a single 
oppressed people or a single source of 
authority to be undermined, or of 
power to be captured.
Most of these ideas were common 
to the Black movement the women’s 
movement the gay movement and, 
later, the green and peace movements
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and, to a limited extent, those disabled 
by injury, illness or addiction. They 
have in common the fact that their 
po ten tia l m embership is c ir ­
cumscribed, and their goals are not 
universal. In this, they differ from par­
ties.
Nationalist movements, now so 
powerful as the agency against Com­
munist Party ancien regimes differ 
again. Though they share the em­
phasis on culture and speak the lan­
guage of liberation and radical 
change, they have powerful roots in 
old traditions of masculinity, land and 
family honour all of which bind 
together dom inant racial com ­
munities. They look backwards to an 
old brotherhood as well as forward to 
a new democracy. Apart from the 
greens, only nationalist movements 
have produced national parties and, 
unlike the greens, they alone claim to 
speak for the whole people, rather than 
acting as an avant garde to advance a 
minority view.
Green parties in all countries have 
attempted to be "parties of a new type" 
and to a considerable extent they have 
succeeded. Their structures are much 
looser and, in particular, they acknow­
ledge the "person" in politics. Like 
movements, green parties expect in­
dividual members to embody political 
principles in their personal life.
These trends are a direct result of 
the movement ethos, which sought to 
dissolve the barrier between public 
and private principles. There is the 
same stress on authenticity; only that 
which comes direct from the self, the 
author, has validity. The British SDP, 
in its early days when feminism was a 
strong influence, demonstrated its 
modernity by establishing "networks" 
to encourage women’s participation. 
But, in opposition to the Liberals espe­
cially, it also raged against "old- 
fashioned" sloppiness. New practices 
were designed as much to create a 
professional elite as to dissolve the 
gulf between professional and 
amateur in politics. The requirements 
of power and the exigencies of size 
both count against new forms. The
larger and more established the West 
German Greens have become, the har­
der it has been for them to maintain 
their ethos of an open democracy.
We should not be romantic about 
movements. Many of those we still 
refer to as the "new movements", as 
representing the spirit of a new age, 
have lost their elan and cohesion. 
Their values survive and networks 
have proved resilient But the mood is 
of consolidation and solace, rather 
than advance.
There have been successes. All the 
"new" movements achieved lasting 
changes in awareness. They have been 
truly liberating. They have changed 
the lives of the direct participants and 
of those around them. They have 
given a political voice to those who 
would otherwise be silent They have 
all challenged the conventions of 
politics. Movements have been the 
main agents in exposing the 
anachronistic structures of party 
politics.
Parties are not of course, going to 
wither away. How, then, can the party 
be changed so that it is a positive agent 
for freedom and democracy? How can 
parties both aim to win state power 
and act independently of the state, as 
voices of the people?
We must first accept a limited role 
for government and the state. The 
most we can ask of a state is that it lays 
down the essential standards of free 
and fair treatment on which civilised 
life depends. In actuality, that is a lot 
more than the nation state or transna­
tional institutions do at the moment
If the potential of the state as an in­
itiator of progress is less, then there 
has to be a corresponding increase in 
the self-activity of our multiple selves 
in civil society. We all have to imagine 
how things ought to be run in ways that 
keep open democratic channels 
without requiring compulsory atten­
dance at weekly meetings. How can 
the health service be made responsive 
to its clients? The bus service? The 
railways? How can a local community 
get its streets cleaned when and how it 
wants? How do we balance the rights
of street-cleaners with the rights of 
street-users?
This is the issue of political leader­
ship and, for labour parties, it means a 
different relationship with the par­
liamentary sphere. Instead of seeing it 
as the apex of the pyramid, it should 
be just one wing of the party. Forms of 
political power outside parliament 
need more energy devoted to them. 
This will be increasingly true if the 
party is serious about decentralisation.
As we have learned from move­
ments, people will begin to form 
political groups as a need arises. The 
party should not seek to take these 
over, as communists have done, in­
stitutionalise them - or ignore them, as 
was labour’s way. Rather, it must be 
able to bring together temporary al­
liances of interest groups which may 
well feel themselves to be in conflict 
This will mean co-operation with 
other parties on specific issues and 
values.
Too often, parties of the left are per­
ceived as dogmatic and exclusive, 
rewarding only those they agree with. 
The party must be the principal 
defender of democratic channels for 
everyone. Through this, it can be the 
defender of civil society against the 
authoritarianism of the state.
In short, the old relationship of 
homogeneous state and class, which 
created the mass political party of 
reform, no longer exists. But the very 
fragmentation of society creates a 
need for clear political leadership; the 
alternative is a drift towards popular 
and governmental authoritarianism to 
stave off "things falling apart". The 
creation of a political form that can 
provide that leadership, as well as the 
promotion of civil political activity, 
independent of the state, are the two 
overriding needs.
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